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Effects of Urban Growth Controls on
Intercity Commuting
Laudo M. Ogura
[Paper first received, March 2008; in final form, May 2009]

Abstract
This paper presents an empirical study of the effects of urban growth controls on the
intercity commuting of workers. Growth controls (land use regulations that attempt
to restrict population growth and urban sprawl) have increased housing prices and
diverted population growth to uncontrolled cities. It has been suggested that resulting
changes in local labour supply might stimulate intercity commuting from uncontrolled
to controlled cities. To test this hypothesis, a gravity model of commuting flows between
places in California is estimated using alternative econometric methods (OLS, Heckman
selection and count-data). The possibility of spatial dependence in commuting flows
is also taken into consideration. Results suggest larger commuting flows to destination
places that restrict residential growth.

1. Introduction
Many jurisdictions in the US have adopted
land use regulations to restrict population
growth and urban sprawl. These regulations,
known as urban growth controls (UGC),
have been advocated to prevent problems
from excessive population growth and urban
sprawl like greater congestion in the use of
government-provided services and infrastructure, loss of open space and pollution.
In the US, UGC have been adopted in areas
that have experienced fast population growth
like California, Portland-OR, Boston-MA,
New York-NY, Boulder-CO, New Jersey,
Maryland, etc.

The widespread adoption of UGC has
prompted many studies on this issue. Fischel
(1990) reviews earlier empirical evidence
that UGC raise housing prices. Brueckner
(1990) and Engle et al. (1992) show how UGC
can theoretically increase housing prices by
reducing future negative externalities from
population growth. Brueckner (1995) and
Helsley and Strange (1995) present alternative models where housing price increases
because the adoption of UGC by one or more
cities restricts the supply of developable land
in the region. Population growth diverted to
neighbouring places increases the demand
for land there, but ultimately raises land rents
everywhere in the region due competition for
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land by mobile households. Levine (1999)
provides empirical evidence that UGC causes
housing supply displacement.
Because population growth is diverted
from controlled to uncontrolled cities, Ogura
(2005) suggests that theoretically UGC could
induce workers to live in an uncontrolled city
but to work in the controlled one. Vermeulen
and Rouwendal (2008) also consider intercity commuting (IC) in a model of UGC,
but with the restricting assumption that all
jobs in the region are located in the central
city, so that UGC there necessarily leads to
IC. On the empirical side, however, there is
no rigorous study on this issue. In a related
work, Cervero (1989) finds that jobs–housing
mismatches in the California Bay Area in
1980 are partially explained by restricted
supply of housing. His study, however, lacks
a direct measure of residential restriction,
employing the proportion of land area zoned
for residential use as a proxy. Aivalotis et al.
(2001) also report jobs–housing mismatches
in the San Francisco Bay Area, suggesting
that newcomers are induced to commute
to work from homes in the outskirts due to
lack of housing available in interior areas.
There is also anecdotal evidence that UGC
stimulate IC. For instance, Kelley and Rabin
(2006) suggest in a news article that UGC in
Santa Barbara have induced high traffic of
commuters on roads that connect the city
to nearby places where housing supply is
less restricted. Therefore, existent empirical
evidence suggests that UGC divert traffic
growth from local roads to intercity roads.
Aivalotis et al. (2001) add that longer intercity commuting increases overall pollution
and loss of labour productivity. Because the
effects of UGC and of commuting on society
are important policy issues, it is important
to reach a better understanding of how UGC
impact IC.
The work presented here attempts to
provide a rigorous analysis of the effects of

UGC on IC. To do so, a gravity model of IC
flows between California cities is estimated,
controlling for distance, number of workers
in the home place, job availability in the
work place and other characteristics of the
places involved, including the adoption of
UGC by the work place. Data on place-toplace commuting flows are obtained from
the US Census Bureau (1990a), while UGC
indicators are based on data from the 1989
survey of growth-control practices adopted
by jurisdictions in the state of California
conducted by Glickfeld and Levine (1992).
As a proxy for the stringency of residential
growth controls, an index is computed
taking into consideration the number of
different types of residential regulations
existent in each place. The justification for
the use of this index is that jurisdictions
should adopt more types of regulations if
they want to make it harder for developers to
produce more housing (similar growth control indexes were used by Brueckner (1998)
and Levine (1999) to test other hypotheses).
In the estimation of IC flows, however, one
of the problems is the existence of large
numbers of zero-valued observations,
requiring the use of alternative estimation
methods (Heckman selection and countdata models are employed for this purpose).
Moreover, the empirical analysis also takes
into account the possibility of spatial
dependence between IC flows. Overall, the
results of the estimations indicate greater
IC flow when the destination place adopts
residential growth control measures.
A possible implication of this result is that
UGC increase overall commuting costs. It is
not completely clear, however, whether this
increase in commuting is socially inefficient.
While greater commuting directly hurts workers and businesses, UGC are adopted to avoid
negative externalities from excessive development, thus the net effect on society’s welfare
can be ambiguous.1 On the other hand, if
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UGC are adopted without co-ordination by
local jurisdictions, it is likely that regulations
can become too strict because negative effects
on workers and firms in neighbouring places
are not considered (Glaeser et al., 2006, and
Glaeser, 2007, suggest the need for regional
co-ordination to avoid excessive construction
regulations).
The remainder of this paper is organised as
follows. The next section discusses Ogura’s
(2005) model of how UGC might affect
IC. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis
of this issue based on the estimation of IC
flows. Concluding remarks are presented in
section 4.

2. Theoretical Analysis
Ogura (2005) presents a theoretical analysis
of the relationship between UGC adoption
and IC of workers. On one hand, his model
suggests that the adoption of UGC depends
on how price elastic the local labour supply
is, which is affected by how easily commuting from other places can occur. On the
other hand, the model also shows that UGC
might eventually stimulate the intensity of IC
between close cities. In the model, IC emerges
solely due to the adoption of UGC—i.e. other
factors are ignored. In practice, however,
Hamilton (1982) notes that jobs–housing
mismatches are expected due to the existence
of households composed of couples who
work in different areas and to the higher frequency of job turnover relative to residential
mobility. Moreover, White (1988) suggests
that workers belonging to minority groups
may face restricted housing choices due to
discrimination, thus having to incur greater
commuting. While these and other factors
are not considered in the theoretical model,
they are included in the empirical analysis
presented in this paper.
A simplified version of Ogura’s (2005)
model is presented next. Because the objective

of this paper is to test whether UGC affect
IC, the model presented here focuses on this
relationship.
2.1 Setup

Consider a closed economy with two regions
indexed by i = 0, 1. There is a linear city in
each region, with width one and length x– i.
The central business district (CBD), where
production takes place, is located at one of
the extremes of the city. Thus, the length
of the city corresponds to the distance
between the boundary of the urban area
and the CBD. The distance between the
CBDs of the two cities is D. Urban land is
occupied by mobile renters, who demand
one unit of land each. Thus, x–i equals the
city population Pi and x–0 + x–1 = P0 +P1 = P,
where P is the total population of workers
in this economy.
Renters also consume a numeraire private
good with income obtained from the supply of labour (one unit is supplied by each
renter), which is exchanged for a wage wj,
where j denotes the city of work. In order
to work in the CBD of her own city, a renter
residing at a distance xi from the CBD incurs
a commuting cost tx i, where t represents
the commuting cost per unit of distance.
However, if she is employed in the CBD of
the other city, she incurs an additional cost
tD. This setting implies that every renter in
one city would incur the same additional
commuting cost if she decided to work in
the other city.2
The land rent paid by a renter residing at xi
is ri(xi), which is a decreasing function of xi
because individuals are willing to bid more
to live closer to their work place in order to
avoid commuting. In equilibrium, land rents
offset all utility differentials related to where
individuals live, equalising renters’ utilities
everywhere. To simplify, assume that utility is derived from the consumption of the
numeraire private good. Thus, the indirect
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utility function of a renter who lives in city
i and works in city j can be written as
ui;j ðxi Þ ¼



wi  txi  ri ðxi Þ
if j ¼ i
wj  tD  txi  ri ðxi Þ otherwise

(1)

Landownership in each region is shared
among absentee landowners.3 To avoid dealing with conflict of interests, assume that each
landowner receives rents from only one of the
regions. Normalising non-urban land rent to
zero, total land rent in each region (denoted
by R) equals Ri ðx
i Þ ¼

Zxi

ri ðxi Þdxi. Regions

0

are symmetrical in all aspects, except that
landowners are politically dominant only in
one of the cities, adopting UGC to maximise
total land rents R.4
Last, production in each city follows the
aggregate function F(Ni), where Ni is the
number of workers in city i, with F'(Ni) > 0 and
F"(Ni) < 0 (i.e. production exhibits decreasing
returns to labour). In addition, F(0) = 0 and
F'(0) = +∞. Therefore, in equilibrium, profit
maximisation by competitive firms implies

	    wi = F'(Ni)

(2)

resulting in positive total profits. To simplify,
assume that profits are shared among absentee
firm-owners, who are neither workers nor
landowners.5
2.2 Effects of UGC

To understand how the adoption of UGC
affects this economy, consider first the case
without controls. Then, there are three equilibrium conditions. First, land rent at the
boundary of each city must equal the opportunity cost of land outside the city, which was
assumed to be zero—i.e. ri ( x–i) = 0. Secondly,

rents at other places in city i are determined
by utility equalisation: ui,h ( xi) = ui,h( x–i) for all
xi and for any h ∈ {i, j}. Consequently

	  ri ðxi Þ ¼ tðxi  xi Þ

(3)

which implies that land rent offsets the
commuting cost differential with respect to
the boundary resident in the city. Thirdly,
utility must be equalised across cities due
to free mobility. Thus, the following equality must hold in equilibrium: u0,0 ( x–0) = u1,1
( x–1). Substituting (2), (3) and the population
constraint x–1 = (P – x–0) in (1), the utility
equalisation condition becomes F'(N0) – t x–0
= F'(P – N0) – t(P – x–0) which is satisfied
when x–0 = 1/2 P ; that is, with a symmetrical
population distribution and no IC of workers.6 Intuitively, symmetrical population and
production are optimal because regions are
symmetrical in their geographical and economic characteristics and production exhibits
decreasing returns to labour.
Now, turn to the case where one city, say city
0, adopts UGC (i.e. x–0 is restricted below 1/2 P).
Since growth in city 1 is uncontrolled, the land
rent function (3) still applies to that city. City 0’s
land rent function is, however, affected. Recall
that residents must be equally well-off everywhere and suppose for the moment that IC does
not occur, meaning that the first expression in (1)
is valid. Noting that u1,1 (x–1) = w1 – tx–1 and setting
this expression equal to u0,0(x0) = w0 – tx0 – r0(x0),
the resulting land rent function for city 0 is
     r0(x0) = t( x–1 – x0) + w0 – w1

(4)

In words, this function implies that land
rents in the controlled city offset two utility differentials: t( x–1 – x0) is the commuting
cost differential with respect to the boundary
resident in city 1 and w0 – w1 represents the
wage differential between cities. Then, note
that when stricter UGC are adopted ( x–0 is
reduced), both differentials go up at interior
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Figure �1.

Change in land rents due to growth controls.

locations of the controlled city. The commuting cost differential increases because city 1’s
size x–1 is expanded as population growth is
relocated to that city. The wage advantage
for workers in city 0 widens because the local
labour supply in the city is restricted relative
to city 1.
The effects of UGC on land rents in each
city are illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure,
note that the slopes of the land rent curves
are -t because the decrease in land rent due
to greater distance is determined by the additional commuting cost t. As UGC become
stricter, city 0’s size is reduced from x–0 to x–0'
and rents in city 0 increase for the two reasons
mentioned earlier. Areas B and B1 depict the
increase in land rents in each city due to the
higher demand for land in city 1 (city 1’s size
expands from x–0 to x–0'). Area C represents the
gain in land rents in city 0 due to the widened
wage advantage. There is also a boundary
rent loss (represented by area A) because the
number of renters in city 0 is reduced by the
stricter UGC. The rent loss ensures that there
is an optimal stringency of UGC.
Consider now the possibility of IC. Then, local
labour supply becomes more elastic as long
as the wage differential between cities is high
enough to cover the cost of IC (which equals
tD in the model), making it advantageous for

 orkers to live in one place and work in the
w
other. As UGC become stricter, the wage differential widens, but only until IC starts to occur.
At that point, inflow of commuters from the
nearby city offsets further population restriction
in the controlled place.7 Formally, once IC starts,
the equilibrium size of the controlled city’s
^ 0 is determined by the equilibrium
workforce N
equality of the wage differential between cities
to the IC cost—i.e.
     F'(N̂0) – F'(P–N̂0) = tD

(5)

Since the number of workers remains fixed at
^ 0 as long as IC occurs, the number of outside
N
workers commuting to the controlled place
increases with the stringency of growth controls. In other words, the adoption of stricter
UGC increases IC flows of workers.
Notice that condition (5) implies that
dN˘ 0
< 0 . Consequently, the magnitude of
dD
^0  x
0 ) decreases with D,
IC flow (given by N
holding the strictness of UGC fixed. In other
words, the greater the distance between cities,
the smaller is the IC flow.8
Last, recall that the stringency of UGC
in this model is chosen to maximise land
rents only. In practice, the adoption of UGC
is determined by additional factors like
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e nvironmental quality. Moreover, landownThe following linearised version of the gravers’ share of political power varies across ity model is used to estimate IC flows9
cities. Because both renters and firm-owners
tend to lose under stricter controls, these
lnðICij Þ ¼ βd lnðdij Þ þ βMi lnðMi Þ þ βMj lnðMj Þ
groups should oppose UGC, leading to dif-     
V
þX
βS ÞlnðM
þ βM
lnðM
¼ βdi Þ lnðd
þ
βMij ÞlnðMi Þ þ βMj lnðM
ij Þ ¼ βd lnðdij Þ lnðIC
ij ÞX
ferent stringency levels depending lnðIC
on the
j
		 ¼ Miji βsi lnðX
Þ
þ
βvj lnðXvj Þ þ εij
si
distribution of political power (Brueckner,X
S
V X
S
V
X
s¼1
v¼1 X
1999, presents a UGC model where politilnðX
Þ
þ
β
lnðX
Þ
þ
ε
¼lnðICβsiÞ ¼
¼
β
lnðX
Þ
þ
βvj lnðXvj Þ þ εij
vj Þsiþ ijβ
βd silnðdij Þ þ βvjMi silnðM
ij
i
Mj lnðMj Þ
v¼1 s¼1
v¼1
cal power is shared among landowners ands¼1    
S
V
X
X
renters). In any case, because cities are difβsi lnðXsi Þ þ
βvj lnðXvj Þ þ εij
¼
ferent in practice, UGC strictness differs
s¼1
v¼1
   
     (6)
across places. Accordingly, the empirical
analysis presented next takes the intensity
of UGC as given. Then, noting that the where ICij represents the intensity of the com^ 0 is determined by D, muting flow of workers from place i to place
local labour supply N
the theoretical implication to be tested is j; dij is the distance between cities; Mi is the
that, when controlled for distance between gravitational mass of place i (represented by
cities and for other characteristics of the i’s labour force); and Mj is the gravitational
cities involved, IC flow increases with the mass of place j (represented by j’s job availstringency of UGC adopted in the destina- ability). Variables Xsi and Xvj are respectively
characteristics of place i and place j that might
tion place.
affect IC between places. As usual, βs are the
parameters of the model and εij is the unex3. Empirical Model
plained residual.
According to the theoretical model, IC from
To test the hypothesis that UGC stimulate
the residence place i to the work place j should IC flows, a variable for the presence or intenbe positively affected by the stringency of sity of UGC is included as one of the charUGC measures that restrict labour supply in acteristics of place j, with a positive expected
the destination place j. To test this hypothesis, estimated coefficient.
IC flows are estimated using an origin–desOther characteristics of places i and j
tination gravity model. The conventional included in model (6) are factors that should
gravity model for spatial interaction is speci- impact workers’ willingness to commute
fied in analogy to Newton’s law of gravity between places: unemployment, ethnicity,
(see Batten and Boyce, 1986). In its simplest income, education, age, gender, marital status,
form, the model predicts that spatial interac- homeownership, occupation and density. Two
tions are negatively affected by distance and dummy variables are also included: the first
positively related to the gravitational masses for origin and destination places located in
of the interacting places. In the case of IC the same county and the second for destinaflows, workers commute for employment, so tion places that are attractive job centres.
that the gravitation mass of the origin place These additional factors are discussed in the
must be the number of workers while the mass Appendix, including comments on expected
of the destination place is the number of jobs and estimated effects.
available. Of course, other characteristics of
each place may reinforce or restrain spatial 3.1 Data
interaction (other control variables used in Information about UGC measures adopted
the estimation are discussed later).
by each jurisdiction is drawn from the 1989
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Table 1.

Growth controls and percentage of jurisdictions adopting them

Type of measure

Percentagea

Restriction on the number of residential building permits
Housing infrastructure requirements for new residential development
Urban limit line beyond which development is not permitted

11.17
29.32
14.80

Proportions refer to the 358 jurisdictions in the sample that provided information through the growth
control survey. The sum is not 100 per cent because some jurisdictions did not adopt measures, while
others adopted more than one type of measure.
a

survey conducted by Glickfeld and Levine
(1992). The survey (answered by local public officials) consisted of a questionnaire on
the types of land use restrictions existent in
each jurisdiction at the end of 1988 approximately.10 For the purposes of this work, only
regulations that should greatly affect local
labour supply are considered—i.e. regulations that restrict housing construction.
Table 1 summarises the frequency of adoption of the types of regulations considered.
While adoption of regulations does not
imply enforcement, it is plausible that there
is a positive correlation between a greater
number of regulations and how concerned
the jurisdiction is about restricting growth
(this view is suggested by Glickfeld and
Levine, 1992). Accordingly, the stringency
of growth controls can be measured through
an index that counts the number of different
types of residential regulations adopted in
each place based on the list of types in Table
1.11 The resulting index is denoted hc and
can vary from 0 to 3. Alternatively, a dummy
variable dhc is created, taking value one when
the jurisdiction adopted at least one type of
residential regulation (true for 41 per cent
of jurisdictions in the sample that answered
the survey).
For IC patterns, journey-to-work flows
between places in California are obtained
from the 1990 Census Transportation
Planning Package (CTPP) assembled by the
US Census Bureau (1990a). The intensity of
IC from residence place i to the work place
j is measured by the flow of workers who

commute from i to j, denoted by ICij. In the
original dataset, there are 668 places with
population over 2500 in 1990, while other
places are categorised as ‘remainder of the
county’ areas. In the estimations, only flows
between the 668 identified places are considered (excluded flows represent 21.63 per
cent of all workers who commute between
Californian cities). Moreover, the CTPP does
not report eventual flows to or from other
states. The final sample used in the estimations also disregards flows to places for which
there was no information on UGC (that was
the case for 310 of the 668 places identified
in the CTPP; IC flows to these 310 places
represent 17.01 per cent of the total flows
between the 668 places).
Additional geographical and socioeconomic
characteristics of the 668 places were obtained
from the 1990 Decennial Census (US Census
Bureau, 1990b, 1990c).
Table 2 presents all variables used in the
empirical work. Descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 3. Besides ICij, hc and dhc,
which were discussed before, all other variables listed in Tables 2 and 3 are used as control variables in the estimations.12
3.2 Methodology

The gravity model (6) is first estimated
using the ordinary least square (OLS)
method.13 One problem, however, is that
ICij equals zero too often (91.4 per cent of
the observations in the final sample used are
zero-valued). To deal with this issue, several
approaches are suggested in the literature.
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Table 2.

Description of variables

Variable

Descriptiona

ICij
hc
dhc
distanceij
labourforce
jobs
unemployrt
minoritypc
age25pc
age45pc
marriedpc
homeownerpc
femalepc
bapc
income
tradepc
manufpc
area
D_county

Number of workers commuting from place i to the work place j, from CTPP
Index of intensity of residential growth controls, 1988
Dummy variable, value 1 if hc>0
Distance between geographical centres of residence i and work place j
Labour force, in thousand workers
Employees, in thousand workers, based on CTPP data
Total labour force 16 years and over, percentage unemployed
Population by origin, percentage non-Hispanic Black or Hispanic
Population by age, percentage under 25 years
Population by age, percentage 45 years and over
Persons 18 years and over, percentage married
Housing units, percentage owner-occupied
Civilian labour force, percentage female
Persons 25 years and over, percentage with bachelor’s degree or higher
Median household income
Labour force, percentage working in trade industry
Labour force, percentage working in manufacture industry
Land area in square kilometres (1 square km ≈ 0.39 square mile)
Dummy variable, value 1 if residence place i is in the same county as
work place j
Dummy variable, value 1 if jobs > 50 or jobs/labourforce >1.5

D_jobcentre
a

Observations are for 1990 and refer to the residence place, unless otherwise noted.

The simplest one just ignores zero-valued
observations. Taking this procedure as a
first attempt, relevant results are presented
in Table 4. Results are in accordance with
theoretical expectations, but further discussion will be left to the next sub-section when
results based on other estimation methods
will be compared.
Another simple alternative suggested is
to replace zero values by a small ad hoc
number, but neither this nor the procedure
of ignoring zero-valued observations is
satisfactory because information is either
dismissed or altered (Linders and de Groot,
2006, discuss these procedures in the case
of trade flows).
In cases where the lack of spatial interaction
between places might be caused by a selection
process, the use of a sample selection model is
recommended. Linders and de Groot (2006)
and Helpman et al. (2008) apply this method

to estimate trade flows. A brief explanation of
this approach is presented next. First, consider
the regression equation
yh ¼ xh 0 β þ µh

(7)

where, y is the dependent variable; x is the vector of covariates; β is the vector of parameters
of the model; and µ is the vector of errors.
In the case of IC flows, this equation can be
rewritten as model (6). Suppose that yh in (7)
is observed only under a selection condition
determined by the equation
sh ¼ zh 0 γ þ eh

(8)

However, only the sign of the selection variable sh can be observed. Hence, taking sh = 1
if sh > 0 and 0 otherwise, the dependent variable in the regression model (7) is observed
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Table 3.

Descriptive statistics

Variable
ICij
hc
dhc
distanceij
labourforce
jobs
unemployrt
minoritypc
age25pc
age45pc
marriedpc
homeownerpc
femalepc
income
bapc
tradepc
manufpc
area
D_county
D_jobcentre

Observations
445 556
358
358
445 556
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
668
445 556
668

Mean

S.D.

14.3
0.6
0.4
223.6
18 338.7
18 278.4
7.0
27.6
36.8
29.9
56.0
58.1
43.2
37 897.1
21.7
21.1
14.9
31.2
0.1
0.1

275.2
0.8
0.5
152.6
71 790.1
82 555.5
4.5
24.0
8.5
9.8
10.3
16.1
3.8
16 008.5
15.4
3.7
7.7
70.5
0.2
0.3

only if sh = 1(in the case of IC flows, a possible
interpretation is that a strictly positive flow
between places only happens if, for instance,
there is an easy way to commute between
these places). If µh and eh are correlated, the
OLS method becomes inadequate to estimate the regression model. One option is to
estimate both the selection and the regression equations together using the maximum
likelihood method. An easier way is to follow
the two-step estimation procedure called
Heckit, named after Heckman’s (1976, 1979)
seminal works. The first step is to estimate the
probability that sh > 0 using the probit method
(i.e. estimate Probðsh ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðzh 0 γÞ, where
8 is the normal c.d.f.) and then to use the
result to compute the corresponding inverse
Mills ratio for each observation (the ratio
γ zh Þ=ð^
γ zh Þ, where φ
is given by λ^h ¼ φð^
is the normal p.d.f.). In the second step,
the OLS method can be used to regress yh
on xh and λ^h . It is typically suggested that
the selection model should also include an

Minimum
0
0
0
0.6
423
1
0.4
2.4
7.7
0.9
10.5
0.7
11.7
14 215
0.7
7.6
1.6
1.1
0
0

Maximum
45 321
3
1
789.8
1 622 423
1 831 531
33.9
98.5
82.4
80.7
88.3
93.8
51.4
130 734
90.9
39.3
41.7
1 215.6
1
1

exclusion restriction—i.e. a variable that
helps to determine the selection process, but
not the outcome.14 The problem is to find a
restriction variable that satisfies this requirement. In the case of IC flows, the restriction
variable must affect the likelihood of a strictly
positive IC flow, but not the intensity of the
flow. A justification for such a variable might
be that there is a maximum commuting cost
that workers are willing to incur. In practice,
however, factors that affect this threshold IC
cost are likely also to affect the intensity of
IC because individual workers have heterogeneous threshold IC costs (thus, as the cost
increases, fewer and fewer workers commute,
until the threshold is reached). Nonetheless,
the estimations suggest that the variable
unemployrtj (unemployment in the work
place j) satisfies the restriction requirement—
i.e. unemployrtj is statistically significant in
the first-step Probit estimation, but not in
the second-step estimation—thus allowing
us to exclude it from the regression model.
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Results from Heckit estimations are presented
in Table 4. Note that the inverse mills ratio
(λ^) is statistically significant, indicating that
the error terms in the selection equation are
in fact correlated to error terms in the regression equation. While the results for the UGC
variables are in accordance with theoretical
expectations, comparison with the results
of other estimations is presented in the next
sub-section.
For comparison, a third method will be
used to estimate IC flows. Because an IC
flow is the number of workers commuting between places, count data estimation
methods might be appropriate. For instance,
Flowerdew and Aitkin (1982) estimate
migration flows with a Poisson model, while
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) use that model to
estimate trade flows. In the current work, IC
flows are estimated using the zero-inflated
negative binomial (ZINB) model because of
the large variance relative to the mean (the
Poisson distribution requires that variance
equals the mean) and the large number of
zero-valued observations. Results based on
the ZINB model are presented in Table 4.
In the table, ln(α) gives the natural log of
the dispersion parameter α of the count
model, which is statistically different from
zero, indicating that the ZINB model is
more appropriate than the Poisson model
(see Stata, 2008). The Vuong test statistic
(Vuong, 1989) shows that the zero-inflated
model is better than the standard negative
binomial model (the null hypothesis is
that the standard model is appropriate; see
Stata, 2008). As shown in the table, results
from this method are qualitatively similar
to the others. Quantitative comparison is
discussed next.
3.3 Results

Results from the OLS, Heckit and ZINB estimations are presented in Table 4. Standard
errors presented there are robust White
standard errors, employed to correct for

heteroscedasticity. Specifications in columns
(1), (3) and (5) include hcj as the growth
control variable, while specifications in (2),
(4) and (6) include dhcj. OLS results are in
columns (1) and (2), Heckit results are in
columns (3) and (4), and ZINB results are in
columns (5) and (6).
The estimated coefficients of distanceij,
labourforcei and jobsj are similar in the OLS
and ZINB estimations, but approximately 1.5
times greater in the Heckit estimations.
Regarding the growth control variables hcj
and dhcj, estimated coefficients are much
larger in the ZINB estimations, while Heckit
estimates indicate smaller effects. Most
importantly, however, these estimates are
positive and statistically significant in all
estimations. Therefore, places that adopt
stricter UGC attract relatively more IC workers. Although it is not the concern of this
work, the following quantitative effects can
be noted: a one-unit increase in the hcj index
stimulates the flow of intercity commuters
by 7.6–13.7 per cent depending on the
method used; in addition, the existence of
residential growth controls, measured by the
dummy variable dhcj, increases IC flows by
7 per cent to 18.9 per cent. Social welfare
effects are hard to evaluate as they depend on
which groups of workers are more affected,
mode of transport, negative externalities
from increased commuting, etc. Attempts to
study welfare effects will be left for future
research.
Results for other explanatory variables
included in the estimations are generally consistent with expected effects, thus supporting
the proposed empirical model. Those results
are discussed in the Appendix.
One potential problem with the empirical
analysis presented so far is that there might
be spatial correlation between flows from
neighbouring origin or neighbouring destination places. If that is the case, estimation
of IC flows must be controlled for spatial
dependence. The next sub-section discusses
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Other control variables were also included in the estimations (see Appendix).

238786
20635

0.173***
(0.034)
-1.451***
(0.049)
0.411***
(0.019)
0.676***
(0.019)

(6)

21979.7***
-0.264***
(0.050)

ZINB

Robust White standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels respectively.

Notes: The dependent variable in ZINB estimations is ICij. The interpretation of the effects of the covariates is, however, the same for all three methods.

a

hcj

0.082***		
0.076***		
0.137***
(0.009)		
(0.009)		
(0.017)
dhcj		
0.070***		
0.067***		
		
(0.014)		
(0.013) 		
-1.627***
-1.623***
-2.259***
-2.258***
-1.453***
lndistanceij
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.051)
lnlabourforcei
0.435***
0.435***
0.616***
0.617***
0.412***
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.019)
lnjobsj
0.667***
0.673***
0.910***
0.916***
0.671***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.019)
l̂			
1.007***
1.011***
			
(0.021)
(0.021)
Observations
20635
20635
238786
238786
238786
Non-zero observations
20635
20635
20635
20635
20635
0.68
0.68
0.72
0.72
R2
F-statistic
1018.2***
1014.07***
1782.09***
1773.58***
2
Wald χ 					
21860.3***
ln(a)					
-0.268***
					
(0.051)

(1)

OLS

Estimation results: OLS, Heckit and ZINB (dependent variable: lnICij)

Explanatory variablea

Table 4.
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dependence (DSD)
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(b) origin-based spatial
dependence (OSD)

Spatial patterns of autocorrelation.

how spatial autocorrelation is tested and
taken into account. Heckit estimations will
be used for this purpose (OLS and ZINB
methods were used before for the sake of
comparison only).
3.4 Spatial Autocorrelation

Spatial dependence between observations
is common when there are spillover effects.
For instance, property crime is likely to be
spatially correlated across neighbouring
areas because criminals are mobile (Anselin,
1988). Local public expenditure and taxation
also experience spatial dependence (see Case
et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002; and Mattos and
Rocha, 2008).
In the case of spatial interactions, LeSage
and Pace (2005) discuss empirical models that take spatial autocorrelation into
account, using them to estimate migration
flows across US states. Based on the two
simplest empirical models suggested by
them, which can be implemented with the
statistical software Geoda™, Figure 2 depicts
the patterns of spatial autocorrelation tested
here. Diagram (a) depicts the case where all
commuting flows from place i to places in
the neighbourhood of j are considered to
be correlated with the flow from i to j—i.e.
there is destination-based spatial dependence
(DSD). Diagram (b) presents the case where
all flows from the neighbourhood of place i
with destination to place j are considered to be
correlated with the flow from i to j—i.e. there

is origin-based spatial dependence (OSD).
The neighbourhood definition adopted here
is ad hoc: jurisdictions are considered to be
neighbours if their geographical centres are
less than 15 miles (24 km) apart. Under this
definition, the average number of neighbours
in the sample is 20 (the median is 12, with
22 places having no neighbours). For the
sake of robustness, estimations were also
performed with thresholds of 10 or 20 miles,
without changes in the relevant results.15 An
alternative neighbourhood definition commonly suggested in the spatial econometrics
literature is based on the existence of common borders, but that might be inadequate
here due to the incomplete sample and the
existence of unincorporated areas between
jurisdictions.
Two main types of spatial autocorrelation
are discussed in the spatial econometrics
literature: spatial lag dependence and spatial
error dependence. An overview of these types
of autocorrelation is presented next (for further details, see Anselin, 1988, 2005). In the
spatial lag case, each observation is directly
correlated to neighbouring observations. In
the spatial error case, the error term is correlated with error terms of the estimations of
neighbouring observations (the assumption
is that unmodelled effects spill over across
observations, resulting in spatially correlated
errors).
Formally, the spatial lag model can be written as
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Table 5. Diagnostics for spatial dependence: statistics for second-step Heckit estimations
(dependent variable: lnICij)
OSDb

DSDa

Moran’s I score
Moran’s I z-value
LM-lag
Robust LM-lag
LM-error
Robust LM-error

(hcj)

(dhcj)

(hcj)

(dhcj)

0.274
69.9***
1494.1***
54.1***
4837.1***
3397.0***

0.275
70.3***
1499.4***
51.3***
4899.2***
3451.2***

0.270
76.5***
2619.6***
234.7***
5787.5***
3402.6***

0.271
76.9***
2630.1***
230.9***
5841.0***
3441.8***

DSD: destination spatial dependence.
OSD: origin spatial dependence.
Notes: LM test statistics are distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and
10 per cent significance levels respectively.
a

b

	     y = ρwy + Xβ + u

(9)

where, y is the vector of origin-destination
independent variables; W is the spatial weight
matrix (to be explained soon); X is the matrix
of other explanatory variables; and u represents the vector of i.i.d. error terms; ρ and β
give the estimated parameters.
In the DSD case, when the flow from place
i to j is estimated, the weight matrix W produces
the weighted average of IC flows originated in
i with destination to places in the neighbourhood of j. In the OSD case, W produces the
weighted average of flows destined to place
j that are originated in the neighbourhood
of i. The weight matrix is computed so that
neighbours’ influences are standardised, with
equal weight for each neighbour (for instance,
if place i has two neighbours, each neighbour’s
weight is 0.5; thus, the sum of weights in each
row of W is one).
The spatial error model can be formally
represented by a system of two equations
        y = Xβ + u

(10)

       u = δWu + v

(11)

where, the first equation is the regression model
to be estimated and the second represents the
residual autocorrelation process; δ denotes the

autocorrelation parameter and v is a vector
of i.i.d. error terms; W is the weight matrix
computed as before.
To assess whether IC flows are subject to
spatial dependence, diagnostic tests are performed for the regression model of the Heckit
estimation method.16 Resulting statistics are
presented in Table 5 (spatial diagnostic tests
and estimations are performed using Geoda™;
for further discussion on the interpretation of
tests and estimation results, see Anselin, 1988,
2005). The first two columns in the table show
tests for DSD, while remaining columns show
tests for OSD. Note that Moran’s I scores are
statistically significant (the null hypothesis of
zero score indicates absence of spatial autocorrelation). However, Moran’s I test detects
misspecification in general (not only spatial
autocorrelation), thus not indicating which
alternative model should be used. To this
end, Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistics
are helpful. The LM-lag and Robust LM-lag
test statistics assume spatial lag models as
alternatives, while the LM-error and Robust
LM-error test statistics take spatial error models as alternatives. All LM statistics reported in
Table 5 are significant. High significance reinforces the view of spatial dependence between
IC flows. When tests for both spatial lag and
spatial error models reject the null hypothesis,
Anselin (2005) suggests the selection of the
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(1)

(2)

(3)

DSD-Errorb
(4)

(5)

OSD-Lagc
(6)

(7)

OSD-Errorc
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b

a

Other control variables were also included in the estimations (see Appendix).
DSD: destination spatial dependence.
c
OSD: origin spatial dependence.
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels respectively.

0.071***		
0.032***		
0.070***		
0.049***
(0.008)		
(0.008)		
(0.008)		
(0.017)
dhcj		
0.063***		
0.023**		
0.070***		
		
(0.012)		
(0.011)		
(0.012)		
lndistanceij
-2.063***
-2.062***
-2.162***
-2.161***
-1.945***
-1.943***
-2.048***
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.016)
lnlabourforcei
0.551***
0.551***
0.575***
0.575***
0.650***
0.651***
0.766***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
lnjobsj
0.904***
0.910***
0.949***
0.952***
0.764***
0.769***
0.775***
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.027)
1.071***
1.075***
0.915***
0.916***
1.064***
1.068***
0.848***
l̂
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.018)
Wy
0.201***
0.201***			
0.295***
0.296***
(0.005)
(0.005)			
(0.006)
(0.006)
Wu			
0.546***
0.547***			
0.651***
			
(0.008)
(0.008)			
(0.007)
Obs
20635
20635
20635
20635
20635
20635
20635
0.74
0.74
0.78
0.78
0.75
0.75
0.79
R2
Log likelihood
-24774.9
-24791.1
-23699.2
-23703.4
-24328.6
-24343.0
-23383.1
Akaike
49613.7
49646.2
47460.4
47468.9
48721.1
48750.0
46828.2
Schwarz
49867.6
49900.2
47706.4
47714.9
48975.0
49003.9
47074.2
LR test
1414.5***
1419.1***
3565.8***
3594.5***
2307.1***
2315.4***
4198.0***

hcj

variablesa

DSD-Lagb

Estimation results of the spatial models: results for second-step Heckit estimations (dependent variable: lnICij)

Explanatory

Table 6.

0.653***
(0.007)
20635
0.79
-23384.3
46830.7
47076.7
4232.7***

0.051*
(0.026)
-2.047***
(0.016)
0.767***
(0.011)
0.779***
(0.027)
0.849***
(0.018)

(8)

2186   laudo M. ogura

	growth controls and commuting   2187

model that produces the largest test statistic
value, although misspecification might be
due to other reasons. According to such an
approach, spatial error models are appropriate. Alternatively, Revelli (2002) and Mattos
and Rocha (2008) compare the log-likelihood
in the estimation of lag and error models,
although doing so also provides support for
the spatial error model. For comparison,
estimation results for both the spatial lag
and spatial error models are presented (in
Table 6).
In Table 6, first notice that the inverse Mills
ratio ( λ^) is statistically significant in all estimations, justifying the use of the selection
model. Secondly, both the spatial lag and
spatial error variables (Wy and Wu) are statistically significant, reinforcing the results of
previous diagnostic tests that suggest spatial
dependence in IC flows. Thirdly, estimates for
the variables distanceij, labourforcei and jobsj
are not very different relative to the non-spatial estimations (shown in columns (3) and
(4) of Table 4). Finally, regarding the estimates
for the growth control variables hcj and dhcj,
coefficients remain positive and statistically
significant as theoretically expected, but the
magnitude of the coefficients is smaller compared with the non-spatial estimations. For
instance, according to the DSD-error model,
a one unit increase in the hcj variable has a
3.2 per cent impact on IC flows, much lower
than the 7.6 per cent impact suggested by the
non-spatial Heckit model.
In summary, results of estimations that
take into consideration spatial dependence
still suggest that UGC stimulate greater IC
flows, although estimated effects are smaller
compared with results from non-spatial
estimations.

4. Concluding Remarks
This work attempts to analyse empirically
how the adoption of urban growth controls
(UGC), a policy that has become widespread

in fast-growing areas, has affected the intercity commuting (IC) of workers. To do so, a
gravity model of IC flows between California
places in 1990 is estimated with a measure
of UGC included as one of the explanatory
variables. Because of the large proportion of
zero-valued IC observations, the two-step
Heckman selection method is used (a countdata method is also employed alternatively).
Moreover, spatial dependence in IC flows is
taken into account.
Regardless of the estimation method used
in this work, results indicate greater IC flows
to places with stricter residential controls,
supporting the hypothesis that UGC induce
jobs–housing mismatches. A possible implication of this result is that UGC make overall
commuting longer and therefore more costly.
This does not necessarily imply that there is
inefficient commuting because controls are
originally adopted by local governments to
improve communities and in the long-run
households and firms should try to move
around to adjust to UGC. However, distortions from longer commuting (for example,
more congestion on intercity roads and
increased overall pollution and loss of worker
productivity) are likely to be socially inefficient because UGC are typically imposed
by local jurisdictions without considering
the location of workers and firms in nearby
places, thus restricting residential development where it might be socially optimal in
the regional point of view. Market-oriented
policies like development fees are often proposed as better alternatives to UGC, but when
UGC adoption is unavoidable it should pay
regard to the effects on commuting patterns
and on workers and firms in neighbouring
communities.
For future research, updated data on land
use regulations in California might allow the
exploration of changes in the effects of UGC
on commuting since 1990 (as people and
firms relocate over time and in face of increasing housing demand). Local governments
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might also be interested in knowing which
commuting areas have been more affected by
UGC (this would require to look at smaller
geographical units like census tracts or traffic analysis zones). Also, studying individual
commuting data might allow one to assess
whether commuting patterns of different
groups of people have been affected differently by UGC.

7.

8.

Notes
1. Excessive commuting has been discussed
before in a different context by Hamilton
(1982, 1989), White (1988), Cropper and
Gordon (1991), Small and Song (1992)
and others. Their studies generally find
that commuting costs are not minimised
when considering actual employment and
residential locations or locations assumed in
the monocentric city model. However, these
works cannot answer whether commuting
patterns are optimal because locations chosen
by workers and firms are not only based on
employment. The adoption of UGC might
be one of the other factors that determine
location choices, thus leading to longer commuting patterns.
2. This setting keeps the analysis simple,
restricted to the case of a monocentric city
with identical individuals.
3. An extension with resident landowners shows
that the effects of UGC on IC are similar compared with the absentee landowners’ case (see
Ogura, 2005).
4. In practice, UGC has been advocated for other
reasons, but since land rents offset utility
advantages across locations, maximisation
of land rents implies that the total pre-rent
utility advantage obtained by local residents
is maximised.
5. Ogura (2005) extends the model by considering the case where landowners and firmowners share political power. Because labour
supply restriction reduces profits, the optimal
population size tends to be greater, but the way
UGC affects IC is analogous compared with
the basic model.
6. Symmetrical population allocation is also the
social optimum because total surplus in this

9.

10.

economy equals production minus commuting costs, which are both optimised at the
symmetrical allocation.
Note that the wage differential stops increasing
because everybody in the nearby city has the
same IC cost (tD). If this cost was heterogeneous, the wage advantage would have to keep
increasing to attract additional workers.
Ogura’s (2005) model goes further and shows
that, when IC happens in equilibrium, the
optimal strictness of UGC decreases with
x0 =dD > 0). This happens
distance (i.e. d
as greater distance implies higher IC costs,
which are incorporated into land rents in
the controlled place because the equilibrium
wage advantage is determined by the IC
cost. Higher land rents everywhere in the
city imply greater marginal rent losses from
tighter UGC and, therefore, less incentive for
^0  x
 0 Þ=dD < 0;
stricter controls. Hence, dðN
i.e. the equilibrium IC flow decreases with
distance when UGC are adopted.
This version is called the ‘unconstrained’ gravity model. In the regional science and urban
transport literatures on commuting flows the
‘doubly constrained’ specification is more
commonly used instead (see, for instance,
Batten and Boyce, 1986). The doubly constrained model includes constraints that force
the aggregate flow from each origin to equal
the number of workers commuting from there
and the aggregate flow to each destination to
equal the number of workers commuting to
that place. While this constrained specification
should generally produce better statistical fit
and forecast ability, the statistical methodology required is more complex. Because the
purpose of this work is simply to test the
significance of the effects of growth controls
on IC flows, the simpler unconstrained specification is used (this also facilitates the use of
alternative econometric methods to address
other problems). In the context of population migration estimation, the unconstrained
specification is used, for instance, by LeSage
and Pace (2005) and Ashby (2007). In the
trade literature, the use of the unconstrained
model is still standard.
While the data might seem outdated, this is
the only publicly available source that has a
comprehensive coverage of UGC measures
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11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

adopted by jurisdictions in a large area. Other
surveys are restricted to smaller areas or to
regulations adopted during a restricted period.
For instance, the study by the Pioneer Institute
for Public Policy Research and Rappaport
Institute for Greater Boston (2005) is restricted
to places in eastern Massachusetts and the
1998 survey conducted by the California
Department of Housing and Community
Development (2000) is restricted to regulations adopted between 1995 and July 1998 in
California.
Measures calculated in analogous ways were
used by Brueckner (1998) to study strategic
adoption of UGC by jurisdictions and by
Levine (1999) to examine the displacement
of housing production.
The values for jobs and D_jobcentre are underestimated if places received workers from
other states. This problem arises because jobs
was computed based on intrastate place-toplace commuting flows reported in the 1990
CTPP for the state of California. The extent
of the impact of this limitation on estimation
results is likely to be small, however, because
counties bordering other states had only 10.79
per cent of the state population in 1990.
For the variable jobs, there are a few observations with zero values, which were replaced by
1 to avoid losing these observations in the log
transformation process.
Further discussion on the Heckman selection
model and on the need for a selection restriction will be found in any modern econometrics textbook. For instance, see Wooldridge
(2006, pp. 618–620).
These additional results are available upon
request.
Spatial dependence in the first step (selection
model) of the Heckit estimation method is
difficult to take into consideration because
estimation of spatial Probit models is cumbersome with the current available statistical
programmes.
An anonymous referee noticed that it might
be redundant to include D_county in the
estimations because distance (included
through the variable lndistanceij) should be
better able to capture labour market integration. D_county is kept in the final estimations
because it exhibits strong statistical signifi-

cance and its exclusion does not change the
qualitative results (as expected, the size of the
coefficient of lndistanceij is slightly reduced
when D_county is included. Results for estimations without D_county are available upon
request.
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Appendix. Other Control
Variables
As explained in section 3, besides distance,
labour force, job availability and a variable related to UGC, additional explanatory
variables are included in the estimations
of IC flows. The additional variables are
measures of unemployment (unemployrt),
population ethnicity (minoritypc), age distribution (age25pc and age45pc), median
household income (income), homeownership
rate (homeownerpc), marriage rate (marriedpc), gender (femalepc), college education
rate (bapc), occupation of resident workers
(manufpc and tradepc) and land area (area).
Two dummy variables were also included: one
for IC flows with origin and destination in
the same county (D_county) and another for
flows destined to job centres (D_jobcentrej).
For exact definitions of these variables and
descriptive statistics, refer to Tables 2 and 3.
Expected and estimated effects of those variables are discussed next (estimated parameters

are not presented here due to space constraints, but are available upon request). In the
following discussion, the suffix i refers to the
residence place while j refers to the work place.
First, the unemployment rate is included to
capture the difficulty in finding jobs. Hence,
unemployrti should have a positive impact
on IC flows while unemployrtj should have
a negative impact, holding everything else
constant. Estimation results, however, indicate
that the latter has no impact on the intensity
of IC flows, although it positively affects the
probability that IC occurs (recall, from section
3, that for this reason unemployrtj is used as the
exclusion restriction in the Heckit estimations).
Demographic characteristics should also be
relevant because workers differ in their willingness to commute longer distances. First,
workers belonging to minority groups tend to
cluster in residency due to housing discrimination (see Cutler et al., 1999, for a study of
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the formation of ghettos) or preferences (see
Gonzales, 1998, for a study of Mexican neighbourhoods). Thus, job–housing mismatches
should be more likely for these workers. (This
effect is suggested by White, 1988, in the study
of excessive commuting.) On the other hand,
if minority workers are clustered and poor,
they may not be able to afford commuting
to other places (this is the spatial mismatch
hypothesis; see Gobillon et al., 2007, for
a recent review of the literature). In fact,
estimations indicate that both minorityi and
minorityj negatively affect IC.
Clustering based on income is also common (for instance, poorer households cannot
afford better neighbourhoods, thus becoming
trapped in bad areas). Accordingly, IC flows
should be greater between places with high
incomei and incomej. Estimation results confirm this prediction.
Matching job and housing locations should
be particularly difficult for married workers
and homeowners. Married workers are constrained by the locational needs of the spouse.
For homeowners, homeownership implies
high moving costs, preventing them from
moving close to work as they change jobs.� (For
example, Hamilton, 1982, suggests these effects
in his study of excessive commuting by workers.) Indeed, results confirm that marriedpc
and homeownerpc (for both the origin and the
destination places) positively impact IC flows.
On the other hand, lower mobility of workers in certain age-groups should negatively
affect IC flows. Older workers are more likely
to be professionally established (with less
frequent job changes and thus residing closer
to work). Moreover, workers with children
should prefer to commute less far due to
greater need to be closely available during
the day. Younger workers should also work
closer to home because their skills are not
specialised, they do not earn much to afford
longer commuting and many of them might
be part-time students (with high opportunity
cost of commuting time). Therefore, IC flows

should be smaller between places with larger
age25pci, age25pcj, age45pci and age45pcj,
which is confirmed by the results.
Female workers might also prefer shorter
journeys because of their greater household
responsibilities. (Lee and McDonald, 2003,
present a literature review and an empirical
assessment on this hypothesis.) Hence, femalepci and femalepcj should have negative estimated coefficients. Results, however, indicate
that femalepcj has a positive effect, although
not always significant. One possibility is that
a larger proportion of female workers in a
place must be complemented by male workers from other cities because women are not
always perfect substitutes for male workers.
Educated workers should also want to avoid
IC due to the high marginal opportunity cost
of commuting time. On the other hand, they
might be clustered for services that are better able to satisfy their needs (school quality
for their children, for instance), implying
longer commuting. Education also indicates
specialised skill, implying that educated
workers might need to commute more to
find jobs that match their skills. Estimations
indicate that IC flows are larger from places
with greater bapci and to places with smaller
bapcj, although estimates for the latter were
not always statistically significant. These
results suggest that educated workers commute more often between cities, with places
that have fewer of such workers demanding
more of them from outside.
Effects are harder to predict for the explanatory variables related to job occupation. A
large proportion of workers in the same
sector could imply that there are activities
in these sectors nearby, although it might
be in neighbouring places. Because the two
activities that employ the largest proportions
of workers are trade and manufacture, the
proportions of resident workers in these
sectors are included in the estimations.
Results indicate that IC flows are smaller
when the residence and work places have
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a large proportion of manufacture workers
(manufpc), suggesting that workers in this
sector live closer to where they work than
workers in other sectors. However, in the case
of trade workers, flows are greater from places
with a high proportion (high tradepci) or to
places with a low proportion (low tradepcj).
A possible explanation is that trade activities
exist in most places, but not exclusively, thus
requiring that trade workers need to find jobs
elsewhere if there is a surplus, commuting to
places where trade workers are scarcer.
The geographical variables added have more
predictable effects. Land area is included as a
proxy for density of workers and jobs. Greater
area (lower density) should make it harder

for jobs–housing matches to occur, inducing
greater IC flows. In fact, both areai and areaj
have positive and significant coefficients. Last,
the effects captured by the two geographical
dummies are obvious. Flows between places
in the same county are likely to be greater
due to better transport and greater economic
integration, while a large availability of jobs or
a high jobs-to-workers ratio should increase
flows to such places. In fact, both D_county
and D_jobcentrej have large positive estimated
coefficients.17
In summary, results for the additional
control variables do not contradict economic
intuition, thus supporting the empirical
model adopted.
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